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VISION AND DREAM IN THE CINEMA 
F. E. Sparshott 
(The following is a strictly lay view of some of the main topics in the aesthetics of 
cinema. l have no special knowledge of any aspect of film, and the material I 
prt!senl is cssen�ially what is to be found on any book on the subject. It is in the 
interpretation of these familiar observations that I hope to have found something to 
say that will be new enough and true enough to be worth presenting.1 ) 
Film seems 10 be unlike any older art in the way it depends on illusion. In fact, it 
is by definition an art of illusion, because you can only explain what a film is by 
saying how it works, and how it works is by creating an ilJusion. A sample definition 
might go something like this: 'A film is a series of images projected on a screen so 
fast that 3nyone watching the screen is given ao impression of continuous motion; 
such images being projected by a light shining through a corresponding series of 
images arranged on a continuous band of flexible material.' 
From the beginnings of film. its makers and critics have diverged in their at· 
titudes to this basic illusoriness. One school bas fastened on film's ability to create a 
semblance of reality, seemingly to recreate the very took and quality of people and 
Lhings in their physical presence and ''itality: co this school. the mission of film is 
no1 mer�ly to record bu1 10 celebrate the physical world and redeem· ii from 
temporality. The opposing school has no1ed that the illusion in question results 
from the projec1ion not necessar.ily of a series of images duplicating a natural 
C\'Cnt, but or any such series whose successive members are sufficiently like each 
other; and this school has seen in fiJm the world's first means of crea.ting convincing 
fantasies. The illusoriness of mm seems to carry with it both the possibility or 
fidelity and the possibility of freedom. Like Hesiod's Muses, it tells the best trulhs 
and the best lies too. 
The positions of tht.:se two schools are not really so directly opposed as I have 
made them sound. It seems likely that for a fantasy to be convincing it must observe 
fidelity to precisely the weight and texture of the real world: in Robert Enrico's 
Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge, we are drawn in co the dream by the conviction of 
the photography, the clumsy struggle of a booted man under water. the light on a 
spider's web. And Siegfried Kracauer. the great spokesman for the realist wing, 
insists 1ha1 what mailers to him is not that a film happens to have been shot on 
location, but that it contrives to convey the sense of the real world. Both reaJists 
and rantasis1s m:av be thought of as combining against films that convey a sense of 
contrivance. actors looking like actors and scenery looking like cardboard, and 
above all against films that make one conscious of an intelligence directing the 
course of e'en ts. Where realists and fantasists part company is that 1he latter would 
insist, and the former deny. that the proper province of cinema includes the im· 
parting of the sense of reality to things that could not exist and e'•ents that could 
not happen. The fantasist would also argue that the conviction that comes from 
fidelity Lo the texLUre of the real world of objects can be replaced by the subtler 
convincingness chat an imaginary world derives from fidelity co its own laws. The 
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expressionist sets and lurid lighting of Caligari are accepted by the fantasists 
because they create a consistently hallucinatory world in which the fancy can 
dwell: they are rejected by the reaJislS because it is a nightmare world. 
You may have noticed that my argument has already gone adrift. The illusory 
conviction of reality that attends the worlds of cinema is not, as I seem to have 
implied. the same as Lhe primary illusion whereby an apparently moving image is 
engendered on a screen. That illusion concerns the presented image as a moving 
shadow: the secondary illusions lhat realists and fantasists exploit have to do not 
wirh what is there on the flat screen but with the s:atus of what that image 
represents. Of course, this second level of illusion depends on the first - it is 
because of che way the screened image is constituted that it can be manipulated in 
the interests of faithfulness or fraud. None the less. they are two separate strata of 
illusion. Thal confronts us with a problem: why should the screened image be 
referred to any particular kind of original? Why should we not take it. as we would 
take a drawing, as a representation of something whose ontological status is a 
matter of indirrerence? No more than when attending a stage play does :any film­
goer feel as if a reaJ event were actually taking place before his eyes. Yet there is a 
;;ense in which a film can and often does make you believe in the reality of what you 
;;ce in a way that a play never does. Why should there be such illusions of 
provenance? The answer seems to lie in the complex relations between 
cinematography and photography, and in the peculiar nature of photographic 
images themsehes. For realists and fantasists alike assume that films are normally 
photographed; but you may have noticed that my sample definition of a film made 
no reference lo photography at all. 
The inrnges whose successive projection makes a film are most easily produced 
by photography; but they can also be drawn directly on the film stock. A 
photograph to represent an object is most easily made by aiming a camera at one, 
but what is photographed may also be a model or a drawing or even another 
photograph. A photograph of an event or happening of a certain sort is most simply 
made by rinding one and photographing it, but it is possible to enact scenes and 
build sets (or the purpose. The required succession of images is most readily 
produced by using a mechanical device that will take a lot of photographs in rapid 
succession and fix them in the right order; but it can be photographed, or even 
drawn, frame by frame. And the obvious way to work a film camera (though, this 
time. not the easiest, because synchronization requires care) is to run it at the same 
'ipeed as you will run your projector; but it can be run as much faster or slower as 
the sensitivity of your film allows. The effect of all these facilities, with their 
coun1ervailing possibilities, is that film has a strong though not irresistible bias 
toward its simplest form, chat in which the projector repeats a camera event. Film­
goers who are not on guard tend to assume, wherever they can, that what is shown 
on the screen results from such a repetition: and, if something in the film precludes 
this assumption. they tend to assume that what they see departs from a camera 
e' enl � little as possible. It is as if we look the projector to be copying a camera 
that enacted a spectator's eye. 
An eye is not a camera, and photographic images do not show what eyes see. 2 A 
roving eye constantly adjusts its iris as brightness varies, and alters its focus as 
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depth changes. Because we have two eyes, everything on which we are not al lhe 
moment focU'iing ) ields a vague. doubled image, so chat "hate' er one ecs cakes on 
a shihing and unstable character. The eye is restless before nature. But berore a 
photograph. all in one plane and with a relatively small range of lumino ity, the eye 
is spared much of its labor. In its stability, singleness and consistency, a 
photographic image is not at all Like the visual world. But there is something that it 
is like. Jt has precisely the quality that theorists used to ascribe to thal venerable 
phantom or optics, the 'retinal image.' This was thought or exactly as if it were a 
phocograph imprinted on the back of the eye and serving in some mysterious sense 
as the true object of vision. In other words, what a photographic image represents 
is a sort or ideal projection, the way our imaginations normalize what we see. When 
photography was lnvented it was hailed as reproducing vision, but that is not what it 
did. What it really accomplished was the realization of an ideal of vision. A 
photographic image is not so much a true one as a superlacively convincing one. 
Photographs carry an overwhelming sense of authenticity. And that their doing this 
doe not depend on their being just like what they are photographs of is clear from 
Peter Ustinov's famous remark. that be filmed Billy Budd in black and white 
because it was more realistic than color. The world is not black and white, but a 
ne" s photograph is. The authenticity is not that of a duplicate bu1 1hat of a faithful 
record.3 
Taken by it'ielf, the primary filmic illusion of movement gives an impression not 
of reality but of a sort of unauributed 'ivacity. That this is so becomes clear when 
one wa1che. an animated cartoon. Verisimilitude adds nothing to 1he lifelikeness or 
such films. and the elaborate equipment used in Disney's heyday to simulate the 
third dimension has mostly been abandoned as no less futile than expensive. The 
sense or reality elicited by such films seems akin to that or figurative painting: we 
attribute the actions we see neither to the real world nor to the screen image. but to 
Donald Duck and the cartoon world in which alone he is alive. ln ordinary films, 
then, it cannot be the illusion of movement that makes us attribute what we see to 
the world of everyday experience: rather, it is the photographic character of the 
image itself that, so far as it is present and is not contradicted by the nature of what 
Ls shown, entices us to take what we see as the record of something that took place 
in the way that we see it taking place. After all, each of us knows what it is to take a 
photograph and then look at the snap he has taken. The film medium. then, has this 
characteristic bias of exposition. providing a direction in which we normalize our 
perception of films made in the most diverse ways. 
The realists and fantasists of whom I spoke at first are best understood as ex­
pressing attitudes not merely to the technical possibilities of their medium but even 
more to this tendency of e'ery film to look much more Jikt a faithful record than it 
i.... Other theortst� adopt variants of the same auicude�. Eisenstein and othu So,iet 
film makers or the twenties claimed that the whole art of film lay in exploiting the 
bin., of cxposiuon by associative or contrasthe cutting, joining strips of 
photographed film from various sources in such a way as to synthesize in the 
spectator' mmd an experiential reality that went beyond the presented imagery. In 
the opposite direc1ion, some contemporary makers of 'underground' film urge that 
10 cut al all b to falsify. Since film looks like a record, a record is what it should be. 
1 1 3  
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The finished film should consisl of all lhal the camera took in the order it  was taken 
in, and if the result is tbal some shots are out of focus, ill·exposed, or irrielevant. 
they will thereby be aJJ the truer lo the film experience. On 1his way of thinking, a 
film records not what happened i11 front of the camera but what happened to the 
mm ill the camera. 
That tlhe realism of film is that of a graphic record and not that of an illusive 
actuality becomes apparent in lbe peculiar nature of film space: the actual and 
suggested spalial relations between elements of a film and between a film and its 
viewers. Some writers imply that film-goers ordinarily feel themselves co be in the 
same spatial relation to the filmed scene as the camera was (or purports to have 
been). On this basis, such trick shots as those which show a room through the 
flames of a fire in its fireplace are condemned not as silly gimmicks but on the 
ground that no observer would be in that position. I cannot reconcile this thesis 
with my experience. I find that I usually identify myself with the camera viewpoint 
only if some such process as Cinerama is used. in which the screen is magnified to 
the point where it becomes almost lhe whole visual environment. Experienced film­
goers are nol disoriented or nauseated by rapid changes in camera position, or 
made giddy by shoes laken looking straight down.• If we really accepced a change 
in camera viewpoint as a change in our own position, rapid intercutting between 
dirrerenl viewpoinls would obviously be intolerable; but in fact we hardly notice it. 
And ye1 there is certainly a sense in which one does have a feeling of spatial 
presence at the filmed scene. This is not be confused with psychological in· 
''Ol\'emen1 in 1he action: one actually construes the scene as a three-dimensional 
!>pac1: in which one is included and has a definite viewpoint. This depth and in· 
elusiveness of cinema space owes much to parallax, the differential motion and 
occlusion of distant objecls as one's viewpoint changes. The importance of parallax 
becomes obvious when, as is often done nowadays, action is interrupted by stop· 
motion. As soon as we become aware tha1 this has happened, lhe whole nature of 
the space in which the action takes place is 'transformed, it goes flal and remote. 
This little-noted factor is important. Without such a change or spatiality, stop· 
mo1ion might make it seem that the world had come to a ha,lt. As it is, it confronts 
us rather with a transition co a different mode of representation. Momentarily, a 
different game is being played. 
The more I reflect on my sense of cinema space, the more peculiar to cinema it 
'ieems. For insLance, the use of a zoom lens increasing the (objective) size of the 
image does have the effect of bringing the action nearer; but getting up and walking 
lowards the screen, though it produces a {subjectively) larger image and does of 
course bring the screen nearer, does not bring 1he action nearer at all. One's sense 
of spatial inclusion in a scene does not depend on one's occupying any particular 
seal. but only on one's being neither too close nor too far to see the screen 
properly. Similarly \\ilh all the distortions of space that result from 1he use of 
various lenses. We accept the resulting plasticity of space relations as a narrative 
de' ice or as an imitation lo an imaginary viewpoim. It does no1 disorienl us. Thus 
David Lean's use of a deep-focus lens for Miss Havisham's room in Great Ex· 
pectalioll.r cenainly has a magnifying effec1, but a curious one: we do no1 feel that 
we are in a big room. but that This is bow it must have seemed lo Pip.' Again, take 
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those banal telephoto shots o( people running towards or away from the camera 
and of course not making much visible headway. Such shots answer to no possible 
real spatial relationship between viewer and event. There is a viewing angle, but no 
possible viewpoint. Yet this disturbs no one. For instance, in the scene where the 
girl runs toward the airplane in Zabriskie Point, the scale relations between girl and 
low horizon are such that we may (and I did) accept what we see for a moment or 
two as an ordinary medium shot; then we notice how slowly the girl is receding, and 
realize that it is a telephoto shot. But the effect of this recognition on me was not to 
alter my feeling of where I was in relation to the scene, but to change my in­
lerpretation of that relation. 
Such phenomena as I have been mentioning suggest that in film our sense of 
space is somehow bracketed or held in suspense: we are aware of our implied 
position and accept it, but are not existentially commilled lo it. We do not situate 
ourselves where we see ourselves to be. One simple explanalion of this detachment 
is that most of the time we are simultaneously aware of a film, as we are of a 
painting, both as a two-dimensional arrangement on a flat surface and as a three­
dimensional scene. Except in moments of excitment or disaffection. neither aspect 
achieves exclusive domination of the mind.5 Perhaps a subtler explanation is that 
cinema vision is alienated vision. A man's sense of where he is at depends largely on 
his sense of balance and his muscular senses, and all a film-goer's sensory cues 
other than those of vision and hearing related firmly lo the theater and seat in 
which he sits. For instance, in the scene with the epileptic doctor in Carnet du Bal, 
which is taken with a consistently tilted camera, one's eyes insist that they are off 
balance but one's body insists that it is not; and the effect on me was the one that 
Ou\'ivier surely intended, a feeling of malaise accompanied by a sense of vicarious 
disorientation on behalf of the protagonist. 
Some of the spatial ambiguities of film are shared with still photography. No 
matter how one moves a photograph around in relation to oneself, it continues to 
function as a faithful record implying a viewpoint from which it was taken, and in a 
sense one continues lo be 'at' this viewpoint no matter what angle one looks at tbe 
photo from. Film differs from still photography not only in the sense of vivacity that 
motion imparts and the sense of depth that parallax gives, but also in the great size 
and contrasting illumination of the screened image in the darkened theater, which 
enable it to dominate the visual sense, and in the relatively invariant relationship 
between screen and spectator. A director determines the audience's spatial 
relationship ro his film. But what he determines remains an imaginary space: we are 
within the rilm's space without being part of its world, and observe from a 
' iewpoint at which we are not situated. 
The alienated space of film is not the only experienced space in which the 
spectator participates without contact, and which he observes from a vantage point 
th3t contrives to be at once definite and equivocaJ or impossible. The spatiality of 
dreams is somewhat similar. Or perhaps, since different people seem to have very 
different dream perceptions, I should only say tbat my own spatial relationship to 
my dream worlds is like nothing in waking reality so much as it is like my 
relationship with film worlds. In my dreams, too, I see from where I am not, move 
helplessly in a space whose very nature is inconstant, and may see beside me the 
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being whose perceptions 1 share. But however many ways there are in which film­
goiag is like dreaming, chere are vital differences. Films, like dreams, involve us in a 
world we cannot control; but we have no sense of effort and participation in their 
world, as. we do in that of our dreams. Filmed reality shares with dreamed reality (as 
nothing else does) its tolerance of limitlessly incoosequenl transitions and trans­
formations; but it lacks that curous conceptual continuity of dreams in which 
what is a raven may become a writing desk or may simultaneously be a writing 
desk, and in which one knows that what looks like one person is really someone 
else. Film-makers do indeed essay equivalences, as when Eisenstein in October 
equaled Kerensky with a peacock, by inlercutting shots of the two entit ies to be 
equated. But these are more like literary similes than they are like the fusions of 
dream. Jn the film, the interpretation cannot be made unless it is suggested by the 
percept itself, or by something else in the film, or by current convention. In the 
dream. the interpretation is imposed a priori - the dreamer simply knows without 
evidence that the two things are the same.6 
The analogy between films and dreams has perhaps been less often noted than 
that between films and daydreams. Daydreams of course are utterly unlike real 
dreams, and unlike 1hem in just the ways in which dreams are like films. But there is 
one quite fundamental way in which the film·goer is like the daydreamer and unlike 
the dreamer. That is, he is awake. However caught up he may be in the world of the 
film. he retains control of his faculties, is capable of sustained and critical auention, 
and above all can rationally direct his incerest. A dreamlike incoosequentiality is 
thus far from typical of film. although it does remain among filmic possibilities, and 
the film-going public at large acquiesces in a deg..ee of cheerful incoherence (as in 
Casino Royale) that in other arts is acceptable only to the sophisticate. 
J suggested that writers on film are often so bewitched by the plausible but 
untenable dogma of che camera eye that they overlook the ambiguous and 
dreamlike character of film space. In the same way, many of them adopt an equally 
dubious dogma about film time: because the eye is the camera on the spot, they 
urge that Iilm time is always present time; in watching a film one seems to see 
things happening now, as though one were present not at the film but at the filmed 
event. But this contention is vulnerable to the same sort of objection that was 
hrought against the doctrine of the camera eye. In one sense it is 1rue but trivial: of 
course. whatever one sees is always here and now, because the terms 'here' and 
'now' are defined by one's presence. But in any other sense it is false, or we should 
not be able to lake in our stride the flash·backs and flash-forwards. the ac­
celera1ions and decelerations. 1hat are part of film's stock in trade. Rather, it is as 
though we were spectalors of the 1emporality of the films we see. Film time bas a 
quality analogous to that dreamlike floating between participation and observation, 
between definite and indeterminate relationships. that gives film space its pervasive 
character. 11 is certainly true that the fundamen1al illusion of motion combines with 
1he con,;ncingness inherent in any photographic record to ensure that we or­
dinarily r.ead lhe presented motion as continuous and as taking just as much time to 
happen as it takes us to observe it; but this supposition is readily defeated by any 
counter-indication. When D. W. Griffith was chaJlenged on bis early use of spatio­
temporal discontinuities, he justified his procedures by appealing to the example of 
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Dicken\; and surely he was right to do so. We accept a fiction film as a narrauve. 
Tht time of a no, el is filmic as its space is not: events can be filmed, as they can be 
narrated. "ith equal facility in any order, at any speed. \\'ith any degree of 
minutenes . But the film maker, unlike the no,elist, uses a language without tenses. 
He has no device proper to his medium with which to signify any temporal relations 
other than immediate succession and interruption. He may use titles, trick 
dis'iolve\. a superimposed narrator's voice, or datable 'isual cues (such as calendar 
leaves) 10 establish his temporal orientations; but some directors seem to (eel that 
such devices are clumsy or vulgar, and prefer (like Bunuel in Tristana) to trust the 
public's acumen or simply to leave the relations indeterminate. 
1 he dream-relationships of film space combine with the narrative nature of film 
time to encourage an ambiguity that may be fruitful or merely irritating. One often 
c..loes not know what one is seeing: part of what is supposed actually to lake place in 
the film ,  or only what is passing through the mind of one of the characters. This 
ambiguity becomes acute whenever there is a temporal leap: for time, as Immanuel 
Kant obscr\'cd. is the form of subjectivity. A flash-back may represent a character's 
memory, or it may be just a narrative de,;ce. The anticipation in a flash forward 
may be lhat or the film maker. or it may be a character's premoni1ion - or e\'en 
merely hi<> hope; and when temporally displaced scenes are recalled or anticipated, 
1he) may be tak.en as standing either for an eYent as it really was or would be in the 
Cilm's reality. or for the way it is (perhaps erroneously or mendaciously) conjured 
up And as soon as we admit this last possibility we must acknowledge that what we 
see on the screen may simply be imagined by one of the charac1ers without any 
implied lemporal reference at all. Still worse, it may ba\'e been inserted by the 
director neither as objective nor as subjective content, but merely as an 'objective 
corrcla11' e,' an evocative image with no other purpose than to show what he, or we, 
or someone, is or should be feeling. 
The status of film events thus readily becomes equivocal. Many modern novelists 
exploit a similar ambiguity: Robbe-0 rillet would be an obvious instance even if he 
had nul done the scenario for L'annee demiere a Man'enbad. But in a novel it is an 
urtificc, even an affectation, a withholding or information one would naturally give; 
in a film it is the automatic result of the most straightforward use of the medium. In 
fact. its novelistic use is often ascribed to the influence of film - or more precisely. 
as Ant.ire Ba7in insists. of the novelists' ideas about film. So I think it is legitimate to 
treat the equhocal status of events as characteristic of the medium of cinema. but 
not peculiar to ii. Such uncertainty may pervade an entire film. The stock example 
of this pcr"asi\'e uncertainty is Fellini's 8 0. in which some scenes are remembered. 
some dreamed. some imagined, and some belong to the reality of the film's story. 
Thue are many scenes whose status is unclear at tbe lime, and some who e status 
ne,er becomes clear. Does the opening scene of the closed car in the traffic jam 
show a man undergoing a seizure which makes his cure necessary. or is the seizure 
dreamed by a man already sick and undergoing treatment? Or is it C\'CO a parable. 
portraying with irs fantac;tic sequel the dimensions of Guido's dilemma? In the 
version of the film I saw, there was nothing to determine either answer. lo Oc· 
c11rre11cc at Owl Creek Bridge the case is different. Almosl the whole of this rilm 
consists of a 'iequence of events whose status remains unresolved until the very end 
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of the film. If we think of the hanged man's escape as real, we may take his repeated 
endeavors to reach his wife's welcoming arms simply as the director's way of 
emphasizing the emotion involved in his arrival;7 or we may take them as sym­
bolizing the hope that drives the fugitive on. Only when he slips through her arms to 
hang at the end of his rope can we be sure that the whole sequence is the delusive 
vision of a man at the moment of death. As for the shots of the insects in sunlight, 
despite the accompanying song we are not sure whether these celebrate the 
fugitive's gladness in his escape from death, or express the director's sense of the 
sweetness of life. Perhaps only if we refer to Bierce's original story does a third 
possibility occur to us. This is what the fugitive sees with hjs 'preternaturally keen 
and alert' senses: 
"He looked at the forest on the bank of the stream, saw the individual trees, the 
leaves and the veining of each leaf - saw the very insects upon them, the locusts, 
the brilliant-bodied flies, the grey spiders stretching their webs from twig to twig. 
He noted the prismatic colors in all the dewdrops upon a million blades of grass." 
When confronted with such ambiguities, one need not assume that there is some 
one right way of taking the scene - perhaps, in our examples, the way Fellini 
describes the scene in his shooting script, or, more remotely, the version that 
answers to Bierce's original story. All the director has done is splice celluloid. If the 
resulting sequence of images does not furnish enough clues to determine a reading, 
lhen no reading is determined. What the diliector had in mind is not enough, for 
what he had in mind may not be what he put on film. Besides, directors quite often 
have nothing at all in mind. The flexibility of film technique is a standing invitation 
to meaningless trickery, and the complexities of production involve limitless risks 
of inadvertent incoherence. 
The lime and space of film combine in a characteristic type of motion which 
inherits their quality of dreamlike plasticity. But there are other aspects of film 
motion that do not make for dreamlikeness b1Ut enhance the sense of actuality. This 
is an endlessly complex topic, and all I will do now is mention a few facts not im­
plicit in what I have said already. 
In the earliest movies, each scene was taken with a fixed camera, so that 
movement was presented as taking place within a fixed frame and against an un­
changing background. A scene in a more recent film is likely to be enriched or 
muddled with three different kinds of camera motion.a The camera may be shifted 
from place to place, turned horizontally or vertically to alter its field of reception. 
or modified by changing the focal length of its lens to take in a greater or smaller 
area.9 This third kind of camera movement is often dismisse d as the equivalent of a 
tracking shot, moving the camera viewpoint towards or away from the scene. But it 
is not quite the same. It retains much of the .sense of getting a different view from 
the same position. 
The free combination of all the kinds of film motion can give a single scene a 
kind of dancing beauty that is at once abstract and realistic and that has no parallel 
in any other medium. Some of you will be familiar with a kind of kaleidoscope in 
which an image is formed by multiplying segments of whatever in your surroun­
dings you aim the tube at. This enchanting device achieves an abstract beauty of 
great inmensity, simply by the symmetrical arrangement of arbitrary portiom of the 
1 1 8 
9
Sparshott: Vision and Dream in the Cinema
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1971
F. E .  SPARSHOTI 
visual field. This abstraction is won a t  the price of sacrificing all the reality of what 
is seen, which is reduced to mere pattern. The formal beauty of film is quite dif­
ferenr. While entering into the visual dance, the filmed elements of the world do 
not lose their realil'y but have it greatly enhanced. The eye dwells without restraint 
on ever new aspects of what is truly there to be seen; the abstract element comes 
from the form of its dwelling. It is the spectator, not what he sees, that becomes 
unreal. 
Camera mobility gives the fiJmed image a shifting frame that combines with the 
camera's notorious neglect of natural boundaries to make the edge of the screen 
function like a window frame through which we glimpse part of a world that 
stretches to infinity. This produces a marked contrast between the actions of 
cinema and theater. The stage world is closed. An actor who leaves the stage loses 
all determinate existence for the audience. On the other side of the scenery there is 
nothing. lo But beyond the edge of the cinema screen is the whole wide world, 
through whose endless continuity the camera may move at will - though not, of 
course. at the spectator's will. 
Because Cilm time and space are rather observed than lived, film motion can be 
speeded up or slowed down within scenes in a way that cannot be matched in the 
live theater, where events have to lake their proper time as determined by the 
human rhythms of the actors' bodies.11 Variations in the speed of filmed actions do 
not always have the same effect, but vary in a way that becomes easier to un· 
derstand if we reflect that motion photography was invented to serve not one 
realistic purpose but two: not only to observe and record movements, but also to 
study and examine them. And, of course, very fast movements are best studied by 
slowing down their representation, very slow ones by speeding it up. Nature films 
are quite regularly made at unnatural speeds, accelerating plant growth and 
decelerating bird flight to something approaching the rhythms of human activity. In 
such studious contexts the spectator has no sense of unreality at all: his anticipatory 
set is one of discovery. and be feels simply that he is getting a better look at what he 
wants to see. But in narrative contexts things are different. Acceleration was early 
discovered to have a reliably comic effect: Buster Keaton's two-reeler The Haunted 
House (1921 ). for instance. gives the impression of having been taken at con­
tinuously varying camera speeds, slowing down to natural speed only for a few 
seconds at a time. The effect of deceleration in narrative films is more variable. It 
may give an impression of joy, of unreality, of obsessiveness, of solemnity, of 
ponderous force, or of inevitability. But though its effects are so various and often 
evade brief description, film directors must find that they are perfectly reliable in 
their various contexts. for they use them regularly. In fact. more than one cliche 
has hardened in this practice. One such is the flash-back reverie (as in The 
Pa wnbroker). where the slowed motion seems ro work by suggesting weightlessness 
and hence elhereaJity. Another is the use of this same weightlessness as a metaphor 
for lightheartedness, as in countless TV commercials. A third is the slow-motion 
death by shooting, most notably in Bonnie and Clyde: largely an appeal to 
voyeurism, bul partly perhaps an equivalent for shock, and partly also a sym· 
bolization of death, as the unreal speed transposes the action into another key of 
reality. 
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One can think of acceleration and deceleration as a kind of pre-editing, the same 
as adding or subtracting frames in a film shot at projector speed. It is basic to film 
that editing can produce an impression of movement by intercutting suitably 
spaced shots of che same object in different positions. The impression does not 
depend on the primary film illusion of continuity: all that is needed is that the 
object should appear to be the same, that its position in successive shots should 
appear to be different, and that the mind can somehow supply a possible trajectory 
to connect the success.ive positions. Such inferred motions are neither possible nor 
felt to be possible. We tend not to believe in them even while we see them, referring 
them to the film as artifact and not to the film as record. 
My main purpose in reminding you of all these peculiarities of film experience 
has merely been to ask you if they don't strike you as extremely odd. Least odd are 
the last item and the first, the primary film illusion of movement and the impression 
of movement produced by cutting. These testify only to aspects of the mind's 
familiar tendency to smooth things over, interpreting whatever confronts it in terms 
of the simplest pallem to which it can be made to conform. But the other things I 
spoke about do strike me as really strange: I mean the whole sense of film reality, in 
which we accept, not only without difficulty but even without any sense of mystery. 
a complex fictional experience whose spatio-temporal character is quite unlike that 
of ordinary life. How is this possible? It is as though the mind had an inbuilt 
capacity to live in an indefinite number or possible worlds, just as according to 
Noam Chomsky it is born with a capacity to learn an infinite number of languages. 
But according to Chomsky there are basic grammatical conditions which a 
language must fulfil to be leamable: perhaps too there are limits on the distortions 
and discontinuities acceptable by a human mind as compatible with a world of 
which the experience is continuous. However, it may be a mistake to represent the 
cinematic phenomena as not merely strange but unexampled. E. H. Gombrich has 
shown in Art and Illusion bow a sense of re.ality in the visual arts can be satisfied 
through the most arbitrary conventions - though here, too, we may suspect that 
there are limits beyond which stylistic trans.formations cease to carry conviction. 
Perhaps film adds nothing to this situation with which we have become familiar in 
painting, other than a number of superficial complications and the seductive 
verisimilitude of the photographic image. All the same, I keep coming back to the 
feeling that the way a film·goer's brain can accommodate disorganizations and 
reconstiitutions of its principles of order borders on the uncanny. I do not think we 
find any adequate analogue for it in those psychological experiments which show 
how perceptual constancy is maintained and restored wbe,n "ision is distorted or 
c;ti .. oriented through inverting lenses and lhe like. What those experiments show is 
ho\\ a normaJ awareness of the real world is retrieved in difficult conditions, not 
how one accepLs as perceptuaUy normal a world lhat never takes on the aspect of 
everyday reality. As I s.aid before. the closest analogy seems to be with dreaming. It 
has always seemed uncanny to me that although my waking self is quite unable 
even to make a convincing drawing of lhe simplest shapes, my sleeping mind not 
only composes continuous and coherently organized visual fields that are com· 
pletely lifelike, but combines them with appropriate sound to make a fictive world 
in which events can be recognized and provided with interpretations that them· 
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selves constitute a plausible simulacrum of thought. Perhaps it is simply the 
dreamer's skill at constructing alcernative realities that film makers and their public 
employ. Well, perhaps. But there are other possibilities. Some people would say 
that films are actually Lifelike in most of the ways we have described.12 Often we 
doubt whether we imagine or remember, whether we wake or dream; our ex· 
perience of space varies with atmospheric and other conditions; time slows down 
when we are bored, speeds up when we are absorbed, seems to stand still when we 
are shocked. There is truth in this contention, but it needs to be qualified. It 
assumes that our experience is measured against some norm of physical space and 
time. But for us as we live it, lived time is natural and normal. The variations we 
spoke of correspond to our own involvement in events. 1n film, on the other hand, 
the changes occur in what is seen by an observer whose attention is assumed 
constant. The variations and dislocations in film space and time have nothing to do 
with that other phenomenon whereby a tedious film seems to take longer than an 
exci1ing one of the same footage. The truth that lies in this contention is perhaps no 
more than that our knowledge of how lived space and time can vary is among the 
things that enables us to accept the variations in film space and time as expressive 
narrative devices. 
No doubt the rrue explanation of the intelligibility of the fictive worlds of film is 
the simple one we gave before. Filmgoers take films as narratives. A film maker 
works from a script, sometimes 'in his head' but usually WTitten down. ia which 
ample stage directions prescribe how each image should be interpreted. Filmgoers 
know this. They know that the film maker is up to something, and that if they are 
patient and attentive they stand a good chance of making out what it is. They start 
with the knowledge that the film is something madle, and made for people to see, 
and (unless they have rashly exposed themselves to the assaults of the avant-garde) 
made for them to make sense of and enjoy. One can at least guess what the missing 
stage directions are. 
It is comparatively seldom, after all, that we learn about any event in real life 
from hearing a straightforward account of it. More often we must actively piece our 
knowledge together Crom hints and allusions, received in no particular order and 
colored by error, bias, and fabrication. Perhaps the character of fitlm is only that of 
our ordinary sources of information transposed into a single medium, with all the 
distortions, compressions, expansions, dislocations, ambiguities, gaps, false clues, 
and subjective interpretations· transformed into properties of the moving ima,ge. 
Our ability not only to follow films but to live imaginatively in their worlds would 
then be no more than the r,ealization in this novel and specialized field of our 
general capacity lo live in a world largely reconstructed from unsatisfactory 
hearsay. 
NOTES 
1. This article is an altered and expanded version of an article on 'Basic Film Aesthetics,' THE JOURNAL 
OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION. S.2, April l97l. Research was facilitated by a Leave Fellowship from the 
Canada Covncil. 
2. The verb 'see' is not of covrse here used as an •achievement' word, as In everyday intercourse It vsually is. 
Perhaps what the camera records Is Indeed what one sees in this sense: It repre:sents a sum of vlsval 
successes, as the end of the paragraph suggests In other terms. 
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3 Thal lh1s Is indeed lhe k.lnd of authenticity a film has may bl! 11a1hered from Truffaut•s L'ENFANT 
SAUVAGE, in which an old fashioned system of arllcvlallon Oris In and irl'S out) and old fashioned-looking 
pno1ogr11phy are used 10 give the impression lhal we are �lng something that really happl!f'ed, bul 
happened a tong time ago For a different account of ptiotooraphlc credibility, see Andre Bazin. WHAT IS 
CINEMA? C Berkeley University of California Press, 1'967), pp. 12· 14 
A Unless, or course, the viewer happl!f's lo be susceplible to verllgo. Different individuals will respond 
variously 10 a given stimulus. and so will lhe�me persof1 at different times; the statements In the text can 
only refer to a supposed 'average• or •normal' response, Iha! on which the fllm-maker seems to rely for the 
succes-s of his devices. 
5 This is. not an isolated spa Ila I phenomenon, but Is connected wllh our overall acceptance or retectlon of the 
film's world A comparable polarity was observed in connection wllll stage reallly by lhe German 
psycholOC)ical aeslhetlcians of the late nineteenth century 
6 Analytically minded philosophers may ask, 'The same WHAT? The "same" In what sense?' The same 
dream en lily; and the sameness, and perhaps even the sense of lhc word •wme.' are peculiar respectively 
10 dreams and to talk about dreams. 
7. This device would then be analogous to that whereby In POTEMKI N a young sailor's acllon In smashing a 
dish Is protracted In time by being split up between a number of Shots, eacl1 of which begins et a mo1T1ent 
earl ler than that In which the previous shot ends. 
a I am told that the regular use of camera motion as a creative resource was established by Murnau In THE 
LAST LAUGH (192.d). 
9 Cameras may also be bounced, joggled, rotated on their focal axes etc.; but never mind about that. 
10. This non existence of the offstage world forms the Iheme of Tom Stoppard's play ROSENCRANTZ AND 
GUILOENSTERN ARE DEAD. 
l l  Conversely, theater has a way of achieving temporal plasllclly that cinema lacks, by exploltlng the 
unrea lity of the offstage world: In theater, but not In cinema, unseen actions are often performed in the 
course of a scene in an impossible short time. without any sense of Incongruity. 
12 'Resnals alms lo construct a purely mental time and space and lo follow the mind which goes faster. or 
skips, doubles back, lingers, repeats, and creates Imaginary scenes. parallels and possibilities.' - Ralph 
Stephe-nson and J Oebrix, THE CINEMA AS ART (Balllmort': Penguin Books, 1965), p. 106, speaking of 
L'ANNEE OERNIERE A MARIENBAO. This account Is acceptable If the authors are thinking 
specifically or DAYDREAMING as the paradigm O'f mental activity. Otherwise, they land pe<haps 
Resnals and Robbe Grille!) are making the fundamemtal mistake of omllllng what since Brentano has 
been called the 'intentional lty' or lhoughl. A mental Image is not (ust a picture floating before the mind's 
eyt' ll is always essential lo it that ii ls related ln a specific way to some real or fictive en Illy, ii is always a 
desire tor, or in some othe.r such definite way ABOUT, something or other 
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